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WASTE MANA GEMENT DISPOSAL SERVICES OF PENNSYLVANIA
v. DEP: CONSIDERING THE PARAMETERS OF THE
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE
IN THE EHB SETTING
I. INTRODUCTION
The "plot" of a typical deliberative process privilege battle
played out recently in Waste Management Disposal Services of Penn-
sylvania, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Protection (Waste Manage-
ment).' In an appeal to the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing
Board (EHB or the Board) from the Department of Environmental
Protection's (DEP or the Department) decision to deny a permit
modification application, plaintiff Waste Management Disposal Ser-
vices of Pennsylvania, Inc. (WMI) requested production of three
DEP e-mails concerning a relevant provision of the Pennsylvania
Code. 2 When the DEP claimed the deliberative process privilege
and declined to produce the e-mails, WMI made a motion to com-
pel in camera review.
3
The deliberative process privilege, long recognized in some
form in United States jurisprudence, protects some government
documents from access by the parties and the public.4 The privi-
lege is controversial because it can become entangled with fric-
1. See Waste Mgmt. Disposal Servs. of Pa., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., EHB
Docket No. 2004-236-K, 2005 WL 3872353 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. Feb. 14, 2005) (cor-
rected copy issued Feb. 15, 2005) (deciding question of in camera review related to
deliberative process privilege claim) [hereinafter WM! 1]; Waste Mgmt. Disposal
Servs. of Pa., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., EHB Docket No. 2004-236-K, 2005 WL
3872354 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. Feb. 22, 2005) (containing opinion and motion to
compel production of e-mails after in camera review) [hereinafter WMI II].
2. See WMI I, 2005 WL 3872353 at **1-2 (prefacing opinion with basic facts
about discovery procedure); 25 PA. CODE § 273.202(a) (16) (1) (2006) (recodifying
25 PA. CODE § 273(a)(16)(i)) (prohibiting municipal waste landfills within certain
conical area of runway flight paths). The code provision describes flight runways
that "are or will be used by turbine-powered or piston-type aircraft during the life
of disposal operations under the permit." Id.
3. See WMI I, 2005 WL 3872353 at **1-2 (explaining DEP's position and rea-
son for denial of e-mails during discovery). While there are many types of privi-
leges in various legal proceedings, for the purposes of this paper, "privilege" will
refer to the "deliberative process privilege" unless otherwise specified.
4. See Kirk D. Jensen, The Reasonable Government Official Test: A Proposal for the
Treatment of Factual Information Under the Federal Deliberative Process Privilege, 49 DuKE
L.J. 561, 563-65 (1999) (explaining basic history and purpose of deliberative pro-
cess privilege).
(151)
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tional constitutional principles.5  The privilege affirms the
separation of powers, the concept that each governmental branch
is, to some extent, insulated and autonomous from the other
branches. 6 If the privilege prevents litigants from accessing admin-
istrative documents, it also prevents the judicial branch from re-
viewing particular aspects of administrative decision-making.7
Conversely, the privilege may interfere with an individual liti-
gant's constitutional due process rights.8 Although some adminis-
trative decisions should sensibly be off-limits to the public for either
their sensitive content or because revealing decision-making docu-
ments may "chill" internal deliberations, courts must balance the
government's need for privilege against a requesting party's due
process rights.9 Ensuring due process may require the presentation
of evidentiary materials sought to be protected by the
government.10
5. See Gerald Wetlaufer, Justifying Secrecy: An Objection to the General Deliberative
Privilege, 65 IND. LJ. 845, 857 (describing competing, Constitution-based conflicts
inherent in deliberative privilege). Wetlaufer colorfully states:
The music in this drama is provided by two competing choruses, one sing-
ing "The Urge to Secrecy" and the other, "The Ode to Democracy and
Accountability." These choruses celebrate the competing values that are
at stake in this controversy, and they vary in their relative strength from
one time and place to another.
Id. (citations omitted). But see Michael N. Kennedy, Escaping the Fishbowl: A Proposal
to Fortify the Deliberative Process Privilege, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 1769, 1770 (2005) (stating
that deliberative process privilege is uncontroversial compared to other govern-
ment privileges).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-13 (1974) (addressing
meaning of presidential executive privilege in light of separation of powers
doctrine).
7. See Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1802 (discussing separation of powers and
interference between branches due to deliberative process privilege). Kennedy's
article discussed various proposals to reform the privilege given its varying ratio-
nales. See id. at 1799-1815. See also City of Colorado Springs v. White, 967 P.2d
1042, 1047-48 (Colo. 1998) (differentiating between two "branches" of "executive
privilege"). Some commentators characterize the "sensitive content" branch of the
privilege as being reserved for presidential communications and state secrets. See
id. These commentators call this the "constitutional" branch. See id. See also Rus-
sell L. Weaver & James T.R. Jones, The Deliberative Process Privilege, 54 Mo. L. REv.
279, 288-90 (1989) (describing roots of privilege and noting lower courts treat
"mental process" branch of privilege as constitutionally-based).
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing due process of law); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 (providing right to due process through states). See also Wet-
laufer, supra note 5, at 892 (describing individual litigant's evidentiary losses due to
deliberative privilege).
9. See Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep't of the Army, 55 F.3d 827, 854 (3d
Cir. 1995) (noting parties' interests must be balanced in determining whether de-
liberative process privilege applies).
10. SeeJosephJ. Brunner, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., EHB Docket No. 2002-
304-L, 2004 WL 817746, at **1-3 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. Apr. 6, 2004) (formulating
2
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In the course of the WMI litigation, the Board issued two opin-
ions that dealt specifically with the DEP's assertion of the delibera-
tive process privilege.11 In the first Waste Management opinion (WMI
1),12 the Board examined the nature of the privilege and granted in
camera review. 13 In the second Waste Management opinion (WA/I
I), 14 the Board found that particular e-mail exchanges determin-
ing the application of a DEP regulation to an individual permittee
were not privileged.1 5 Collectively, WM/H I and WM! // provided
thorough analysis of the deliberative process privilege in Penn-
sylvania and showed why the EHB court procedure particularly re-
quires fair evidentiary access to the DEP documents. 16
This Note provides an overview of the deliberative process priv-
ilege, examines the current state of the privilege in Pennsylvania
and addresses the adverse impact a broadly-defined privilege would
have on EHB proceedings. 17 Section II discusses the relevant facts
of the case and the parties' arguments.18 Section III outlines the
history and nature of the deliberative process privilege through fed-
eral, Pennsylvania state and EHB case law. 19 Section IV establishes
the reasoning of WM/Iand WMIJ.20 Section V analyzes WMIand
WMIIin relationship to the positives and negatives of applying the
privilege to decisions made at lower administrative levels. 21 Section
VI considers the most current views of the privilege in Pennsylvania
position that invariable deliberative process privilege would deny basic due process
rights to participants in EHB trial).
11. See Waste Mgmt. Disposal Servs. of Pa., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., EHB
Docket No. 2004-236-K, 2005 WL 3872378, at *2 n.1 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. May 18,
2005) (summarizing deliberative process privilege discovery dispute and its resolu-
tion before trial).
12. EHB Docket No. 2004-236-K, 2005 WL 3872353 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. Feb.
14, 2005) (corrected copy issued Feb. 15, 2005).
13. See id. at **1-2 (concluding in camera review was appropriate).
14. EHB Docket No. 2004-236-K, 2005 WL 3872354 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. Feb.
22, 2005).
15. See id. at *2 (determining no privilege applied after in camera review).
16. See WMIII, 2005 WL 3872353 at **2-7 (giving overview of history and na-
ture of deliberative process privilege); WM! II, 2005 WL 3872354 at *11 (explain-
ing deliberative process privilege in light of special circumstances of EHB review).
17. For a discussion of the consequences of a broadly defined deliberative
process privilege in the EHB, see infra notes 250-60 and accompanying text.
18. For the relevant facts of Waste Management, see infra notes 24-34 and ac-
companying text.
19. For a review of essential federal and state deliberative process privilege
case law, see infra notes 35-163 and accompanying text.
20. For the EHB's reasoning in WMI Iand WMI II, see infra 164-216 and ac-
companying text.
21. For a discussion of the impact the deliberative process privilege has at the
lower administrative level, see infra 217-49 and accompanying text.
20071
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case law. 22 This Note concludes that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court should officially adopt the privilege in order to settle confu-
sion as to its existence in the state judicial process, but should be
careful to distinguish situations in which the government's deci-
sion-making concerns a party who is contesting the decision itself.23
II. FACTS
In 2004, WMI applied to the DEP for a major permit modifica-
tion seeking a vertical expansion of the company's landfill located
in Pottstown, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. 24 The DEP de-
clined to grant the modification, informing WMI of its decision by
letter dated October 13, 2004.25 The DEP concluded that WMI
failed to demonstrate it would comply with a section of the Penn-
sylvania Code prohibiting the operation of landfills within certain
distances of certain runway flight paths.26 WMI appealed the denial
to the EHB.2 7 During discovery, WMI requested production of
three e-mails, all of which the DEP refused to produce.2 8 WMI then
filed a motion to compel in camera inspection of the e-mails. 29
In WMI I, the DEP argued that in camera review was inappro-
priate because the e-mails were protected by the deliberative pro-
cess privilege. 30 The DEP supported its position through an
affidavit describing the e-mails as "briefing memos," which "de-
scribe [d] the proposed action, matters of law and policy, outline [d]
areas of disagreement both within and outside the Agency and
ma[de] recommendations on the decision the Agency must
22. For a discussion of the limited deliberative process privilege in Penn-
sylvania case law, see infra 250-60 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the possibility of adopting a limited deliberative pro-
cess privilege in Pennsylvania, see infra 250-60 and accompanying text.
24. See WMI I, EHB Docket No. 2004-236-K, 2005 WL 3872353, at **1-2 (Pa.
Env. Hrg. Bd. Feb. 14, 2005) (corrected copy issued Feb. 15, 2005) (providing
general background of case procedural history).
25. See id. at *1 (describing timeline of permit request and denial).
26. See id. (referring to portion of Code at center of permit issue); 25 PA.
CODE § 273.202(a)(16) (1) (2006) (recodifying 25 PA. CODE § 273(a) (16) (i))
(containing airport-navigable airspace regulation).
27. See WMII, 2005 WL 3872353 at **1-2 (noting both parties requested expe-
dited EHB trial).
28. See id. (outlining DEP's refusal to comply with e-mail request). The DEP
declined to produce the three e-mails and instead produced a privilege log con-
taining "skeletal" information about the correspondence. See id. at *2.
29. See id. at *1 (considering and granting WMI's motion for in camera review
of three e-mails).
30. See id. at *2 (stating DEP's position on in camera review).
4
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make." 31 In sum, the e-mails interpreted the flight path regulation
in light of WMI's permit request. 32 After consideration, the Board
ordered in camera review in WAM!. 33 After reviewing the docu-
ments in camera, the Board ordered the DEP to produce the e-
mails to WMI in WMI 11.34
III. BACKGROUND
A. History and Elements
Arising from the traditional concept of sovereign immunity,
the deliberative process privilege protects the "internal delibera-
tions" of government officials. 35 The privilege is based on (1) re-
spect for the administrative process, (2) the importance of open
department discussions in making quality decisions and (3) respect
for the autonomy of high-level government decision-makers. 3 6 In
sum, the application of the privilege is based either on the common
31. See id. (citing DEP's reasoning contained in Sherman affidavit). Accord-
ing to the DEP, the e-mails contained (1) a statement of the DEP's interpretation
of the regulation, (2) a statement of WMI's interpretation of the regulation, (3) an
evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of each interpretation and recommen-
dations regarding the interpretations and (4) a statement of the comments re-
ceived during the permit application process and a recommended resolution of
the issues raised by the comments. See id.
32. See WMI, 2005 WL 3872353 at *2 (summarizing affidavit swearing to con-
tents of e-mails). The affidavit also stated the DEP relied on "briefing" memos to
make decisions through open, free discussion and should therefore be treated as
confidential. See id. The DEP claimed that the privilege applied not only to the
substance of the e-mails but should extend to the identities of the persons partici-
pating in the discussions and the location of those discussions. See id. at *7.
33. See id. at *15 (ordering in camera review).
34. See WMI II, EHB Docket No. 2004-236-K, 2005 WL 3872354, at *2 (Pa. Env.
Hrg. Bd. Feb. 22, 2005) (finding no deliberative process privilege for DEP to as-
sert). The Department appealed this decision to the commonwealth court and
sought a stay from the Board; the Board denied the request. See Waste Mgmt. Dispo-
sal Servs. of Pa., Inc. v. Dep't of Envil. Prot., EHB Docket No. 2004-236-K, 2005 WL
3872355, at *4 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. Feb. 25, 2005). The Board then granted a brief
stay until the commonwealth court determined if the Board's order should be
stayed pending appellate review, but the EHB trial occurred while the Depart-
ment's deliberative process appeal was in the commonwealth court. See Waste
Mgmt. Disposal Servs. of Pa., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., EHB Docket No. 2004-
236-K, 2005 WL 3872378, at *2 n.1 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. May 18, 2005) (noting delib-
erative process privilege issue was dropped from case). WMI decided to drop its
discovery request for the e-mails because it felt it was more urgent to have the
permit issue resolved quickly. See id. In the final adjudication, the Board found
the Department's interpretation of the Code provision proper. See id. at *29.
35. See Weaver & Jones, supra note 7, at 279-85 (establishing basic characteris-
tics of deliberative process privilege).
36. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939,
94547 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (establishing importance of "frank discussion" between sub-
ordinates and chief decision-makers in administrative actions). See also Kennedy,
supra note 5, at 1180 (calling Justice Reed's justification for deliberative privilege
2007]
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law principle that administrative departments cannot operate in a
"fish bowl," that is, exposed to public scrutiny, or on the constitu-
tionally-based theory that certain high-level, sensitive communica-
tions simply must remain off-limits to the general public.3 7
The deliberative process privilege may arise during court pro-
cedures, where the government is either a party or an entity hold-
ing evidence relevant to the litigation.3 8 The privilege is also
frequently invoked in the course of federal Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) requests, Pennsylvania's Right to Know Act (RTKA) re-
quests or through other states' freedom of information laws. 39 If
the government believes documents requested by a party are privi-
leged and deserve confidential protection, the government has the
burden of proving the deliberative process privilege applies. 40
Federal and state court decisions, definitions and exemptions
contained in FOIA and the RTKA demonstrate the deliberative pro-
cess privilege analysis. 41 For the deliberative process privilege to ap-
"classic"); United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (protecting "mental
processes" of Secretary of Agriculture).
37. See City of Colorado Springs v. White, 967 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Colo. 1998)
(quoting Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1975)) (explaining com-
mon law reasoning for protection of government agencies' decision-making
processes and noting constitutional and common law bases for privilege). See also
Weaver & Jones, supra note 7, at 288-89 (noting that lower courts treat "mental
processes" branch of privilege as though based on constitutional principles but
current trend is towards treating privilege as common law based).
38. See Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1783-89 (outlining deliberative process privi-
lege settings and applications).
39. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2000) (listing exceptions to federal freedom of in-
formation disclosure); 65 PA. STAT. ANN. § 66.1-66.9 (West 2002) (noting that it is
Pennsylvania's equivalent to federal FOIA). The purpose of freedom of informa-
tion acts is to allow public access to government documents that qualify as "public
records." See 65 PA. STAT. ANN. § 66.2 (describing procedure for access to public
records). The RTKA will play a tangential role in this Note's discussion, for several
important Pennsylvania cases address the privilege as it arises out of RTKA re-
quests. For information on freedom of information statutes in other states, see Erin
Hoffman, The Deliberative Process Privilege in Kentucky, 25 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN L.
JUDGES 485 (2005) (discussing adoption of deliberative proccss privilege in Ken-
tucky and describing privilege in various states' "freedom of information" statutes).
40. See Weaver & Jones, supra note 7, at 300 (stating that initial burden of
proving privilege falls on government agency). To counter demands for materials
in adversarial situations, the government must list and describe the subject matter
of all documents over which it claims the deliberative privilege, so that the party
requesting the materials can challenge the privilege claim. See id. An affidavit at-
testing to the contents of the document must accompany the itemized listing. See
id. The description of the claimed privilege contents is known as a Vaughn Index,
after Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See id. at 306.
41. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (including nine exceptions to right to federal infor-
mation); 65 PA. STAT. ANN. § 66.1 (defining "public record" that sets limits of at-
tainable information). For an overview of the parts of the deliberative process, see
City of Colorado Springs v. White, 967 P.2d 1042 (Colo. 1998) (establishing common
6
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ply, the communication in question must first be "predecisional" in
nature.42 This means it must be part of the deliberation "process"
and cannot occur after the government department or agency has
reached a final position or policy.43 Second, the communication
must be "deliberative," meaning it must give recommendations or
"express opinions on legal or policy matters."44 Factual material is
not deliberative. 45
The EHB accepts the standard characteristics of deliberative
process-protected government material, but finds the privilege re-
quires meeting three specific predicates. 46 For the privilege to ap-
ply, the communications must be: "(1) intended to be confidential;
(2) constitute deliberations in that the communications were made
in the context of devising an institutional decision; and (3) relate to
legal or policy matters. '47
If the government proves the deliberative process privilege
protects the materials at issue, the court must balance the govern-
ment's interest in preserving confidentiality against the requesting
party's need for the information. 48 The balancing test often favors
law existence of deliberative privilege in Colorado) and Hamilton v. Verdow, 414
A.2d 914 (Md. 1980) (discussing privilege through "executive privilege" lens).
42. See Weaver & Jones, supra note 7, at 290-95 (discussing meaning of
"predecisional" communication).
43. See id. (stating protected communication must be predecisional); see also
City of Colorado Springs, 967 P.2d at 1051 (citing N.R.L.B. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
421 U.S. 132, 151 (1975)) (noting that predecisional materials are protected be-
cause quality of decision will be affected by communications reviewed by decision-
makers at time decision is made). One signal that a communication might be
predecisional is if the communication moves "upstream" from lower to higher offi-
cials. See Weaver & Jones, supra note 7, at 291-92 (explaining "upstream" and
"downstream" terminology). Predecisional communications become non-confi-
dential as they turn into actual decisions over time. See id. at 293-94.
44. See Weaver &Jones, supra note 7, at 296-98 (discussing what qualifies and
disqualifies information as "deliberative") and Hoffman, supra note 39, at 488 (ex-
plaining material must be part of consultative process and provide recommenda-
tions or opinions on legal matters in order to be deliberative).
45. See Weaver &Jones, supra note 7, at 297 (citing EPA v. Mink, 401 U.S. 73,
87-88 (1973)) (acknowledging "facts" to be separate from "deliberation").
46. See WMI I, EHB Docket No. 2004-236-K, 2005 WL 3872353, at *7 (Pa. Env.
Hrg. Bd. Feb. 14, 2005) (corrected copy issued Feb. 15, 2005) (citingJosephj Brun-
ner, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., EHB Docket No. 2002-304-L, slip op. at 4, 2004 WL
103130, at **2-3 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. Jan. 8, 2004)) (listing three prerequisites for
deliberative process privilege to apply).
47. See id. at *6 (citingJosephj Brunner, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., EHB Docket
No. 2002-304-L, slip op. at 4, 2004 WL 103130, at *2 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. Jan. 8,
2004) (discussing three deliberative process privilege criteria).
48. SeeJosephj Brunner, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., EHB Docket No. 2002-304-
L, 2004 WL 103130, at **3-4 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. Jan. 8, 2004) (analyzing balancing
process); see also Weaver &Jones, supra note 7, at 315-19 (reviewing and validating
deliberative process privilege balancing test).
2007]
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the government because requested materials must be central to the
issue under judicial review.4 9 A court will not grant access to pe-
ripheral materials that do not relate to the heart of the litigation. 5 0
This requirement removes many documents from the litigants' po-
tential access. 5'
B. Federal Case Law
Several federal cases established guiding concepts regarding
the application of the deliberative process privilege in various con-
texts. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. United States (Kaiser Alu-
minum)5 2 and United States v. Morgan (Morgan V 53 are seminal to
the modern application of the deliberative process privilege.5 4 In
Kaiser Aluminum, the United States Court of Claims made the oft-
cited statement that public policy favors "open and frank discussion
between subordinate and chief concerning administrative action,"
thus justifying the need for the deliberative process privilege. 55 Al-
lowing public access to the "administrative reasoning process" and
thereby forcing administrative departments to operate in a "fish
bowl" would be against the public interest. 56
49. See Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep't of the Army, 55 F.3d 827, 852 (3d Cir.
1995) (quoting First Eastern Corp. v. Mainwaring, 21 F.2d 465, 468 n.5 (D.C. Cir.
1994)) (weighing "relevance" as part of test to determine whether to grant deliber-
ative process privilege).
50. Contra Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1771-72 (finding that "uncertainty" of "ad
hoc" balancing test harms and undermines goals of deliberative process privilege).
51. See Wetlaufer, supra note 5, at 892 (finding "general deliberative privilege"
most directly affects individual litigants denied access to documents). Wetlaufer
notes that documents and testimony that "bear closely enough upon [a litigant's]
case" would have been discoverable in the absence of the privilege. Id.
52. 157 F. Supp. 939, 946 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
53. 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
54. See City of Colorado Springs v. White, 967 P.2d 1042, 1047 (Colo. 1998) (dis-
cussing importance of early federal cases). Other essential cases include: Carl
Zeiss Siftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.C. Cir. 1966); N.RL.B. v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975); Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.
1975); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d
729 (D.C. Cir. 1997). See City of Colorado Springs, 967 P.2d at 1947-48 (some cita-
tions omitted) (referencing various cases treating privilege).
55. See Kaiser Aluminum, 157 F. Supp. at 946 (citing need for open discussion
in administrative action). The court referred to the deliberative process privilege
as "executive privilege." See id. at 943. The court also found it unnecessary to
examine the privileged document in camera, as this would create "an absolute
right for judicial examination and determination of all evidence whose discovery
the executive deemed contrary to public interest." Id. at 946.
56. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (comparing ex-
posed administrative decision-making to operating in a fish bowl); Kaiser Alumi-
num, 157 F. Supp. at 941 (holding executive privilege applicable to intra-office
documents if particular circumstances of case did not require overriding
privilege).
8
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The court noted, however, that the privilege is not absolute.57
The demand's circumstances must be considered to determine if
the production of the materials would injure the government's con-
sultative function.58 If the United States consents to being sued,
"full disclosure of all facts in possession of either party to the litiga-
tion is normally desirable."59 But when production of the materials
would be contrary to the public interest, the materials should not
be revealed.60
Morgan IV addressed the type of deliberative protection af-
forded to agency heads.61 In the course of issuing a series of deci-
sions, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the "mental processes" of
agency heads cannot be probed. 62 When the Secretary of Agricul-
ture (Secretary) made administrative decisions based on the record
and conferences with officers in the Department, the procedure re-
sembled a judicial proceeding. 63 Probing the Secretary's decision-
making process would interfere with his quasi-judiciary responsibili-
ties.64 Administrative departments were therefore "deemed collab-
orative instrumentalities of justice and the appropriate
57. See Kaiser Aluminum, 157 F. Supp. at 946 (finding inspection of certain
government documents to be against public interest but not "absolutely").
58. See id. at 941 (clarifying that privilege is not absolute).
59. See id. at 944 (stating usual position that revelation of all facts is desirable).
60. See id. (excluding from full disclosure items contrary to public interest).
61. See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (noting importance of
allowing agency head to make decisions free from scrutiny).
62. See id. (establishing protection of "mental processes" of administrative de-
partments). Four separate Supreme Court opinions, collectively comprising the
"Morgan Doctrine," set forth several administrative law tenets, including the re-
quired procedure for hearings taking place within the administrative branch. See
Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936) (finding that administrator who de-
cides adjudication must hear facts); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938) (de-
fining requirements of administrative "full hearing"); United States v. Morgan, 307
U.S. 183 (1939) (reversing order of District Court granting distribution of court-
paid funds to plaintiffs); United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941) (placing "veil"
over thought processes of decision-makers) [hereinafter Morgan IV].
The Secretary had issued an order setting maximum price rates for livestock.
See Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1938) (stating facts leading to chal-
lenge of decision of Secretary of Agriculture). In a series of opinions, the Supreme
Court addressed whether the Secretary made an "informed decision" on the mat-
ter. See id. During discovery at the district court level, the market agencies were
permitted to depose the Secretary and question him about his decision-making
processes regarding the price-fixing plan. Morgan IV, 313 U.S. at 422. The market
agencies questioned the Secretary on how he came to his decision and the type of
consultation he had with subordinates. See id. The Supreme Court held the Secre-
tary should not be subjected to this line of questioning. See id.
63. See Morgan IV, 313 U.S. at 422 (quoting Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S.
468, 480 (1936)) (comparing deliberative role of Secretary to process used by
judges to decide cases).
64. See id. (noting that examining judge's mental process would destroy judi-
cial responsibility).
20071
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independence of [the departments and the courts] should be
respected by the other. '65
The Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Nixon
(Nixon) 66 provides important perspective on the limits of the privi-
lege when it is based on constitutional separation of powers.67 The
Supreme Court held the president did not possess an absolute im-
munity privilege within judicial processes. 68 The Court acknowl-
edged the importance of the separation of powers, but held the
judicial branch had an Article III duty to "do justice in criminal
prosecutions." 69 In short, "neither the doctrine of separation of
powers, nor the need for [confidentiality of] high-level communica-
tions, without more, [could] sustain an absolute, unqualified Presi-
65. See id. (emphasizing need for administrative independence from judicial
branch). Some commentators distinguish three separate types of deliberative priv-
ileges, including: (1) the "deliberative process privilege," meant strictly to prevent
chilling communications in the future; (2) the privilege afforded high officials
with quasi-judicial roles (like the Secretary of Agriculture); and (3) presidential
privilege, discussed in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). See Wetlaufer,
supra note 5, at 3 n.3 (identifying ten separate confidentiality privileges). Even if
treated as separate privileges with separate justifications, the composite influences
of Kaiser, Morgan Wand Nixon (and their progeny) impact every thread of deliber-
ative privilege, whether the privileges are separated or clumped under one deliber-
ative process privilege heading. Thus the executive branch's deliberative process
assertions may arise from its desire to prevent a "chilling effect," but its motives
could also be jealous guardianship from judicial review, a motive more akin to a
constitutionally-based separation of powers theory of privilege.
66. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
67. See id. at 703 (affirming denial of President Nixon's motion to quash sub-
poena of materials relating to conspiracy to defraud United States).
68. See id. at 714-15 (upholding subpoena for in camera review of documents
related to criminal investigation). A special prosecutor subpoenaed materials re-
lating to the criminal prosecution of the Watergate scandal. See id. at 683. Presi-
dent Nixon moved to quash the subpoena in the District Court for the District of
Columbia. See id. at 686. The Supreme Court granted certioari to decide whether
any presidential privileges prevailed over the need to conduct in camera review of
the materials. See id.
It is important to note that there is some difference between the deliberative
process privilege, "presidential communications privilege," and other privileges.
See Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1780-81. The presidential communications privilege
applies specifically to presidential decision-making. See id. at 1782. See also In re
Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 754-55 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (setting forth heightened stan-
dard required to overcome presidential privilege). Although Nixon concerned the
president's deliberations and advisements, it is still relevant and influential in the
deliberative process privilege realm for recognizing that most deliberative govern-
mental privileges have limits. See id. at 742. In Nixon, the realm of privilege ended
where a need for criminal prosecution began. See id. at 743.
69. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707 (referring to essential duty of judicial branch).
10
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dential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all
circumstances. 70
C. Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court and Pennsylvania
Supreme Court Cases
The existence of the deliberative process privilege in Penn-
sylvania is open to some debate. 71 Three cases, Commonwealth v.
Vartan (Vartan),72 LaValle v. Office of General Counsel of the Com-
monwealth (LaValle),v3 and Tribune-Review Publishing Co. v. Depart-
ment of Community and Economic Development (Tribune-Review),74
comprise the most current and relevant Pennsylvania opinions in
this area of the law. 75 A fourth case, Joe v. Prison Health Services
(Joe)76 emphasizes the state's overall disfavor of any evidentiary priv-
ileges.77 Pennsylvania courts also rely on the Third Circuit decision
in Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army of the United
States78 for its adoption of a succinct list of factors to consider when
deciding whether the privilege applies. 79 In balancing interests, a
court should consider at least
(i) the relevance of the evidence sought to be protected;
(ii) availability of other evidence; (iii) the "seriousness" of
the litigation and the issues involved; (iv) the role of the
70. See id. at 706 (asserting importance of criminal prosecution over presi-
dent's claim of absolute privilege). Because the communications did not deal with
military or other secrets, the president's claim of confidentiality failed. See id.
71. See WMII, EHB Docket No. 2004-236-K, 2005 WL 3872353, at *6 (Pa. Env.
Hrg. Bd. Feb. 14, 2005) (corrected copy issued Feb. 15, 2005) (side-stepping "onto-
logical question" of existence of deliberative privilege by assuming DEP has right
to exert one).
72. 733 A.2d 1258 (Pa. 1999).
73. 769 A.2d 449 (Pa. 2001).
74. 859 A.2d 1261 (Pa. 2004), affg 814 A.2d 1261 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
75. See Commonwealth v. Vartan, 733 A.2d 1258 (Pa. 1999) (holding that de-
liberative process privilege protected deliberations by members of Pennsylvania
Supreme Court regarding decision to not build new courthouse); LaValle v. Office
of Gen. Counsel of the Commonwealth, 769 A.2d 449 (Pa. 2001) (deciding privi-
lege question based on RTKA terminology); Tribune-Review Publ'g Co. v. Dep't of
Cmty. and Econ. Dev., 859 A.2d 1261, 1269 (Pa. 2004) (affirming commonwealth
court decision but finding adoption of deliberative process privilege unnecessary);
Tribune-Review Publ'g Co. v. Dep't of Cmty. and Econ. Dev., 814 A.2d 1261, 1264
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (establishing applicability of deliberative process privilege
in commonwealth court).
76. 782 A.2d 24 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001).
77. See id. at 32 (finding deliberative process privilege inapplicable to re-
quested prison health documents).
78. 55 F.3d 827 (3d Cir. 1995).
79. See id. at 854 (noting district court should consider various factors in bal-
ancing interests).
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government in the litigation; [and] (v) the possibility of
future timidity by government employees who will be
forced to recognize that their secrets are not violable.80
1. Commonwealth v. Vartan
Vartan is often cited as proof that the deliberative process privi-
lege exists in Pennsylvania. 81 The case involved a lease agreement
between Vartan and the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania
Courts (AOPC) for a piece of land on which Vartan was to build a
courthouse. 82 When the AOPC terminated the contract, Vartan ini-
tiated a breach of contract action with the Board of Claims.83 The
Board of Claims sustained preliminary objections from the AOPC
and dismissed the complaint.84 When Vartan appealed, the com-
monwealth court reversed and remanded.85 During discovery on
remand, Vartan issued a notice of deposition and a subpoena to
former Chief Justice Nix.8 6 The Board of Claims denied the
AOPC's motion to quash the subpoena, and the commonwealth
court dismissed the AOPC's petition for review. 87
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then granted the AOPC's ap-
peal petition and held that the deliberative process privilege "may
be invoked to prohibit disclosure of the deliberations of the mem-
bers of the Court regarding the signing of a lease and its termina-
tion."88 The plurality opinion held that the Board of Claims erred
80. See id. (quoting First Eastern Corp. v. Mainwaring, 21 F.2d 465, 468 n.5 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (listing factors to consider when applying balancing test).
81. See, e.g., LEONARD PACKEL & ANNE BOWEN POULIN, WEST'S PENNSYLVANIA
PRACTICE, EVIDENCE, § 33 (2d ed.) (2005) (stating that Pennsylvania recognized
deliberative process privilege in Vartan).
82. See Commonwealth v. Vartan, 733 A.2d 1258, 1260-61 (Pa. 1999) (establish-
ing facts and procedural history).
83. See id. at 1261 (stating Vartan's argument to Board).
84. See id. (describing events leading up to litigation).
85. See id. (stating procedural history).
86. See id. (stating relevant portions of discovery process).
87. See Vartan, 773 A.2d at 1261 (reviewing procedural history).
88. See id. at 1266 (specifying narrow circumstance in which privilege applies).
The court quashed the subpoena of Chief Justice Nix:
In light of this Court's constitutionally required duty to administer the
courts, and in recognition of the public importance of an agreement to
provide court house facilities, we hold that the deliberative process privi-
lege may be invoked to prohibit disclosure of the deliberations of the
members of the Court regarding the signing of a lease and its
termination.
12
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in failing to quash the subpoena of Chief Justice Nix.8 9 The court
began its analysis with a review of the essential characteristics of the
privilege: (1) it is meant to benefit the public by ensuring that offi-
cials freely exchange their ideas; (2) it must be made before the
deliberation is over; and (3) it must be part of the deliberative pro-
cess by containing legal or policy matters not including facts. 90 The
court cited the Morgan IV principle that the "mental processes" of
high-level officials may not be probed.9' In summary, the court
"recognize[d] the existence of a deliberative process privilege that
protects confidential deliberations of law, or policymaking that re-
flects opinions, recommendations or advice."9 2
2. LaValle v. Office of General Counsel of the Commonwealth
In LaValle, the government exerted the deliberative process
privilege to counter a RTKA request.93 A group sued the Penn-
sylvania Department of Transportation (PennDot), alleging
PennDot breached an automotive emissions testing contract.94 The
case settled out of court.9 5 After settlement, PennDot denied sev-
eral state senators RTKA access to an auditing report prepared by a
consultant that was important to the settlement outcome. 96 The
senators appealed through the state court system and ultimately re-
ceived review by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.9 7
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that PennDot could in-
voke the privilege and refuse to turn over the requested docu-
ments.98 The court primarily discussed what constituted a "public
89. See id. (noting Vartan failed to show that taking ChiefJustice Nix's deposi-
tion was necessary to case).
90. See id. at 1263-64 (citations omitted) (recognizing existence of deliberative
process privilege consistent with privilege's goals and purpose).
91. See id. at 1263 (citing United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941))
(calling Morgan protection of decision-making process "long recognized").
92. See Vartan, 773 A.2d at 1265 (tailoring recognition of deliberative privi-
lege). The opinion also addressed an argument that because judicial immunity
from suit was inapplicable in this case, the deliberative process was equally inappli-
cable. See id. The court noted that judicial immunity prevents a suit from going
forward altogether, although the deliberative process privilege does not completely
prevent a litigant from proceeding with his or her action. See id. at 1265-66.
93. See LaValle v. Office of Gen. Counsel of the Commonwealth, 769 A.2d 449, 451-
52 (Pa. 2001) (reviewing case facts); 65 PA. STAT. ANN. § 66.1 (containing RTKA
requirements).
94. See LaValle, 769 A.2d at 451-52 (providing background information).
95. See id. at 451 (noting state eventually paid plaintiff Envirotest $145 million
in settlement of action).
96. See id. (reviewing case procedural history).
97. See id. at 454 (allowing appeal to determine whether report was public
record under RTKA).
98. See id. at 460 (finding records not within purview of RTKA).
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record" within the meaning of the RTKA. 99 The court interpreted
the "public record" definition through deliberative process con-
cepts, but stated: "this Court has not definitively adopted the delib-
erative process privilege" and "it is beyond the scope of the present
opinion to do so."'1° The court concluded the General Assembly
did not want to submit internal deliberations to public exposure
through RTKA requests.'10
3. Tribune-Review Publishing Co. v. Department of Community
and Economic Development
Tribune-Review is relevant for opinions issued in the Penn-
sylvania Commonwealth Court (Tribune-Review I) and the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court (Tribune-Review 11). 10 2 The Tribune-Review
Publishing Company made a RTKA request for all applications re-
jected by a Department of Community and Economic Development
(DCED) grant program. 10 3 DCED denied the request, claiming the
applications were not "public records" under the RTKA.10 4 The
commonwealth court initially decided the rejected applications
were "public records" as defined by the RTKA. 10 5 On remand from
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court following the LaValle decision, the
commonwealth court reversed itself, in light of the LaValle interpre-
tation of a RTKA "public record."' 6 The Tribune-Review I court as-
serted the importance of the deliberative process privilege, which
"protects from disclosure documents containing 'confidential delib-
99. See LaValle, 769 A.2d at 452 (focusing discussion on meaning of "public
record"); see also 65 PA. STAT. ANN. § 66.1 (containing RTKA definitions).
100. See LaValle, 769 A.2d at 457-58 (citing Weaver & Jones, supra note 7, at
279-85) (stating policies informing deliberative privilege and work product doc-
trine are "useful" to construction of RTKA).
101. See id. (refusing to interpret RTKA to include deliberative materials of
agency decision-making).
102. See 7ibune-Review Publ'g Co. v. Dep"t of Cmty. and Econ. Dev., 859 A.2d 1261
(Pa. 2004) (affirming commonwealth court decision based on LaValle); Tribune-
Review Publ'g Co. v. Dep't of Cmty. and Econ. Dev., 814 A.2d 1261 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2003) (accepting deliberative process privilege in commonwealth court).
103. See Tribune-Review I, 814 A.2d at 1262-63 (describing Tribune-Review's
RTKA requests).
104. See Tribune-Review II, 859 A.2d at 1264 (stating DCED position that re-
jected contracts were not RTKA public records).
105. See Tribune-Review 1, 814 A.2d at 1263 (noting court's initial decision that
contracts were public records and explaining procedural remand to common-
wealth court in light of LaValle). See also Tribune-Review Publ'g Co. v. Dep't of
Cmty. and Econ. Dev., 751 A.2d 689 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (comprising original
commonwealth court decision).
106. See id. (citing LaValle v. Office of Gen. Counsel of the Commonwealth, 769
A.2d 449 (Pa. 2001)) (acknowledging Pennsylvania Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of public records under RTKA).
14
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erations of law or policymaking, reflecting opinions, recommenda-
tions, or advice."' 10 7 Significantly, the court stated: "this Court
adopts the deliberative process privilege."108
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. 10 9 The
court noted, however, that it was not necessary for the common-
wealth court to have adopted the deliberative process privilege be-
cause the case could be decided on RTKA definitions alone. 110
Tribune-Review II specifically declined to adopt the privilege, stating
that "while we agree with the principles we articulated in Vartan,
adoption of the deliberative process privilege would be superfluous
in light of our construction of the definition of the phrase 'public
record' "111
4. Joe v. Prison Health Services
In Joe, an inmate's estate brought a negligence action against
the City of Philadelphia and its prison health contractor, Prison
Health Services, Inc.112 The Court of Common Pleas of Philadel-
phia County granted the estate's motion to compel production of a
variety of healthcare-related documents. 113 On appeal, the com-
monwealth court affirmed, finding the defendants did not establish
the right to a variety of privileges, including the deliberative process
privilege. 11 4
The court noted "Pennsylvania law does not favor evidentiary
privileges."1 15 Further, "'[e]xceptions to the demand for every
man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed,
107. See id. at 1263-64 (quoting Commonwealth v. Vartan, 733 A.2d 1258, 1263
(Pa. 1999)) (noting privilege protects discretion of agents and promotes inter- and
intra-agency flow of information).
108. See id. at 1264 (emphasis added) (adopting deliberative process
privilege).
109. See Tribune-Review II, 859 A.2d at 1269 (affirming order of common-
wealth court).
110. See id. (finding documents to not be public records under RTKA, making
adoption of deliberative process privilege unnecessary).
111. See id. (calling commonwealth court adoption of deliberative process
privilege "superfluous").
112. See Joe v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 782 A.2d 24, 28 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2001) (providing case background).
113. See id. (stating lower court holding).
114. See id. at 34-35 (affirming lower court decision concerning several
privileges).
115. See id. at 31 (citing Commonwealth v. Stewart, 690 A.2d 195 (Pa. 1997))
(providing history of evidentiary privileges in Pennsylvania).
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for they are in derogation of the search for truth.'"116 The court
stated the deliberative process privilege should be narrowly con-
strued and the government "must present more than a bare conclu-
sion or statement that the documents sought are privileged,"
otherwise "the agency, not the court, would have the power to de-
termine the availability of the privilege." 117 The defendants did not
prove the documents represented a "deliberative process," for the
documents showed nothing more than an ongoing review of Prison
Health's performance. 118
C. Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board Cases
The EHB functions as a trial court, hearing environmental
cases arising out of DEP decisions. 119 The EHB must conform to
the provisions of the Environmental Hearing Board Act (EHB
Act). 120 The EHB hears cases de novo in that a DEP decision is not
final until the adversely-affected party has the opportunity to appeal
the decision to the EHB. 12 1 In Department of Environmental Protection
v. North American Refractories Co. (NARCO), 122 the commonwealth
court held the DEP has the power to interpret environmental regu-
lations, while the EHB is limited to "determining whether the
agency's interpretation is consistent with the regulation and with
the statute under which the regulation was promulgated."' 23
The commonwealth court distinguished the EHB/DEP rela-
tionship from the structures of "traditional agencies," where adjudi-
cation may function as rulemaking. 124  For example, in
116. See id. (citing Hutchinson v. Luddy, 606 A.2d 905, 908 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992)) (quoting Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979)) (establishing state's
position on evidentiary privileges).
117. See Joe, 782 A.2d at 33-34 (citing Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep't of the
Army, 55 F.3d 827 (3d Cir. 1995)) (providing persuasive federal language based on
Pennsylvania law).
118. See id. at 34 (finding defendant's broad interpretation of deliberative
privilege would shield any document evaluating performance of contractor).
119. See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7514 (containing jurisdictional information on
EHB).
120. See generally 35 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 7511-16 (comprising EHB Act).
121. See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7514(c) (setting forth rule regarding finality of
DEP actions).
122. 791 A.2d 461 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
123. See id. at 464-65 (noting deferential precedent for administrative inter-
pretations of DEP's own regulations).
124. See id. at 465-66 (distinguishing traditional agencies from EHB/DEP rela-
tionship). The court summarized the branches of environmental protection in
Pennsylvania as follows:
The EHB and the Department are two branches of the tripartite adminis-
trative structure.... The third branch of that structure is the Environ-
16
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Commonwealth v. Public Utilities Commission (Public Utilities Commis-
sion),125 the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) made tariff regula-
tions and also handled a complaint based on those regulations.
126
In contrast, having been granted adjudicative authority only, the
EHB must exercise "'the type of nonpolicy-making adjudicatory
powers typically exercised by a court in the agency-review con-
text."1 2 7 In short, because the legislature insulated the EHB from
the DEP and gave it "quasi-judicial" powers, " [t] he EHB's duty is to
determine if the Department's actions can be sustained or sup-
ported by evidence taken by the EHB." 128 Deferring to the DEP
interpretations is "consistent with this duty."129 The role of
"NARCO deference" in conjunction with the deliberative process
privilege is essential to the Waste Management opinions. 130
1. Lower Paxton v. Department of Environmental Protection
In Lower Paxton Township v. Department of Environmental Protec-
tion (Lower Paxton), 3 Lower Paxton Township appealed the DEP's
denial of its Act 37 Water Plan (Plan). 132 At issue was whether a
particular water treatment technology could be used as part of the
township's Plan.1 33 In the course of discovery, the DEP made a mo-
tion for a protective order based on the deliberative process privi-
lege to prevent the deposition of the Deputy Secretary for Water
Management (Deputy Secretary). 134
mental Quality Board (EQB). The Department is the executive branch,
assigned various duties to implement and enforce environmental statutes
and regulations.... The EHB is the judicial branch, empowered to hold
hearings and issue adjudications on orders, permits, licenses or decisions
of the Department. Section 4 of the Environmental Hearing Board Act
(EHB Act) . . . describes the EHB as "an independent quasi-judicial
agency." The EQB is the legislative branch, responsible for developing a
master environmental plan for Pennsylvania and empowered to formu-
late, adopt and promulgate rules and regulations for the Department.
Id. (citations omitted).
125. 331 A.2d 598 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
126. See id. at 599-600 (describing tariff provisions and litigation procedure).
127. See NARCO, 791 A.2d at 466 (quoting Martin v. Occupational Safety and
Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 154 (1991)) (providing support for limiting
EHB role to review).
128. See id. (finding EHB deference to DEP interpretations to be consistent
with job of reviewing DEP analysis of evidence on record).
129. See id. at 466 (defining role of EHB respecting DEP actions).
130. For analysis of the WMJ I and WM I opinions, see infra notes 163-248.
131. EHB Docket No. 200-169-K, 2001 WL 300060 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. Mar. 7,
2001).
132. See id. at *1 (giving procedural background).
133. See id. (providing case background).
134. See id. (stating DEP's basis for motion to Board).
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The EHB denied the motion. 13 5 Under the EHB Act, an appel-
lant has the right to a de novo EHB trial. 13 6 A DEP decision ad-
versely affecting a party is not final until the EHB has heard the
appeal. 13 7 It would therefore be "illogical to maintain that the core
information about how and on what bases the Department arrived
at its decision under review is to be locked away."138 It appeared
the Deputy Secretary was "directly, significantly and persistently"
part of the decision-making process ending in the denial of the
township's Plan.139 The Board held that to disallow the Deputy Sec-
retary's deposition would lock away the core basis for the DEP's
decision.1 40 "Review of and scrutiny of the Department's delibera-
tive process with respect to the action under appeal is a part of the
very essence of the Appellant's right and the Board's function and
duties. Application of the privilege .. . would render nugatory Ap-
pellant's rights and the Board's responsibilities." 141
2. New Jersey DEP v. Pennsylvania DEP
In New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v. Penn-
sylvania Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP),142 the EHB
recognized the deliberative process privilege in conformance with
the commonwealth court's Tribune-Review Idecision. 143 In response
135. See id. at *2 (dismissing DEP's unsupported reliance on Vartan decision).
136. See Lower Paxton, 2001 WL 300060 at *3 (discussing provisions of EHB
Act).
137. See id. (citing 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7514(c)) (emphasizing need for Board
to hear appeal before adverse Department action can take effect). For an overview
of the Environmental Hearing Board, see William Hoffman & Steven Horst, The
EHB: DEP's Friend or Foe? Environmental Hearing Board Review, 15 VILL. ENVrtL. L.J.
173 (2004) (providing background to creation of EHB).
138. See Lower Paxton, 2001 WL 300060 at *3 (stating favorability of EHB's
ability to review DEP decisions). The Board stated, "[i]t is hard to imagine a set-
ting which is more antithetical to application of a deliberative process privilege."
Id.
139. See id. at *1 (describing role of Deputy Secretary in permit process ac-
cording to deposition of Department employee). Lower Paxton also rejected the
Department's reliance on Vartan. See id. at *3 (distinguishing from Vartan empha-
sis on judicial role). The Lower Paxton court found that Vartan contained facts
"peculiar to that case." Id. at *2. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had analogized
the inquiry into Chief Justice Nix's decision-making process to the immunityjudges have regarding their judicial activities. See id. at *2. But in LowerPaxton, the
Deputy Secretary "[was] not within that ambit." Id. at *2.
140. See id. at *3 (finding inability to access information illogical).
141. See id. (noting relevance of deliberative privilege to both appellant and
Board).
142. EHB Docket No. 2001-280-C, 2003 WL 91359 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. Feb. 21,
2003).
143. See id. at *5 (citing Tribune-Review Publ'g Co. v. Dep't of Cmty. and Econ.
Dev., 814 A.2d 1261 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003)) (considering supplemental briefing
18
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to certain discovery requests, the New Jersey Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection (NJDEP) asserted the deliberative process
privilege. 144 The EHB declined to find that the Tribune-Review land
LaValle decisions were limited to RTKA requests because the cumu-
lative effect of those and other cases showed the "Commonwealth
Court intended to recognize a more generally-applicable eviden-
tiary privilege which extends beyond the confines of public docu-
ments law."'1 45
In an extended footnote, however, the EHB emphasized the
privilege was not asserted by the Pennsylvania DEP but rather by the
New Jersey DEP. 146 The EHB noted "there clearly remains a ques-
tion whether the deliberative process privilege may be properly as-
serted by the [Pennsylvania DEP] in a Board proceeding, given the
conflict between the privilege and the Board's statutory duty to re-
view [the Pennsylvania DEP's] decision-making process."'147 In the
following cases, the EHB had the opportunity to examine the exis-
tence of the deliberative process privilege when asserted by the
Pennsylvania DEP.
3. Brunner I
Brunner, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Protection (Brunner
1) 148 involved a dispute over whether a statute required Brunner to
pay a fee related to its landfill operation. 49 During discovery,
Brunner requested and the DEP declined to produce certain
memos, citing the deliberative process privilege, among other privi-
leges. 150 The EHB granted Brunner's motion to compel the DEP
to produce the memos.15 1
in light of commonwealth court's intervening opinion). Tribune-Review II was not
yet before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See id.
144. See id. at *1 (explaining basis for motion to compel).
145. See id. at *8 (agreeing with NJDEP that distinction between RTKA re-
quests and privilege asserted in case was insignificant).
146. See id. at *13 n.9 (emphasizing nature of deliberative process privilege
assertion).
147. See NJDEP, 2003 WL 913519 at *13 n.9 (citations omitted) (raising essen-
tial question of scope of EHB review of DEP decisions). NJDEP was decided before
NARCO. The EHB expressed no opinion regarding whether recent cases provided
adequate authority for the DEP to assert the privilege in an EHB proceeding. See
id.
148. EHB Docket No. 2002-304-L, 2004 WL 103130 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. Jan. 8,
2004).
149. See id. at *1 (briefing factual issue before court).
150. See id. at *2 (reasoning that deliberative process privilege may be asserted
in proceedings before Board).
151. See id. at *1 (noting DEP's objections to Brunner's request to produce).
Decided after the Tribune-Review commonwealth court decision but before its ap-
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The EHB found that if a party is able to present a credible
showing of need, the EHB will apply a two-step analysis: (1) if the
EHB finds the communication qualifies for the privilege, it will (2)
balance, on a case-by-case basis, the party's interest in the docu-
ments against the DEP's need for confidentiality. 152 The Board em-
phasized that the deliberative process privilege is "qualified," in
contrast to privileges that apply regardless of whether the protected
information might have been dispositive. 153 The EHB therefore
had to weigh the importance of the evidence to the appellant
against the effect of disclosure on "frank and independent discus-
sion" within the DEP.154 The court held the DEP could assert the
peal, remand, reversal and second appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the
EHB allowed the DEP to assert the deliberative process privilege because the privi-
lege appeared to be under active review by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See
id. at *2. Brunner I did note a current Board trend toward recognizing the privi-
lege, representing a departure from an historic disinclination to recognize its exis-
tence. See id. at *2 (citing F.A.W. Associates v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., EHB Docket
No. 90-228-B (consolidated docket), 1990 WL 263908 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. Dec. 31,
1990); City of Harrisburg v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., EHB Docket No. 88-120-F, 1990
WL 270894 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. May 30, 1990); New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v.
Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Prot., EHB Docket No. 2001-280-C, 2003 WL 91359, at
*1 n.2 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. Feb. 21, 2003)) (using trend toward acceptance of privi-
lege to support opinion).
152. See id. at *2 (citing Commonwealth v. Vartan, 733 A.2d 1258, 1263 (Pa.
1999); Lower Paxton Twp. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., EHB Docket No. 200-169-K, 2001
WL 300060 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. Mar. 7, 2001); New Jersey Dep't of Envil. Prot. v. Penn-
sylvania Dep't ofEnvtl. Prot., EHB Docket No. 2001-280-C, 2003 WL 91359 (Pa. Env.
Hrg. Bd. Feb. 21, 2003)) (providing basic deliberative process privilege steps).
153. See Brunner I, 2004 WE 103130 at *5 (comparing qualified deliberative
process privilege to absolute attorney-client privilege).
154. See id. at *4 (describing elements on each side of balancing test). To
determine whether the evidence is very important to the appellant, the Board
listed these probing questions:
To what extent does the communication contain information that is rele-
vant to the appellant's case? Is the same information available from other
sources? What is the quality of those alternative sources, if they exist? Is
the information unnecessarily cumulative or does it add obvious value? Is
the communication specific to the appellant, which would weigh heavily
in favor of allowing disclosure, or more generic in nature?
Id. Regarding elements which would make protecting the DEP's internal commu-
nications more important than allowing its contents as evidence, the court listed
the following:
[x] Confidentiality
[x] Deliberations
[x] Context - connection to a decision or action
[x] Opinion, advice, etc. v. facts
[x] Law or policy
[x] Relevance
[x] Sensitivity
In analyzing these factors, we will consider all pertinent facts, including
the who, what, where, when, why, and how of the communication.
Id. at *5.
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deliberative process privilege, but the Board ordered in camera re-
view to determine whether the privilege applied. 155
4. Brunner II
In Brunner, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Protection (Brun-
ner i),I56 the Board applied its Brunner I deliberative process privi-
lege test to discussions involving only a few highly placed
employees. 57 The discussions concerned the state-wide implica-
tions of a new statute. 158 The employees involved in the discussions
intended to propose an official DEP interpretation of the statute to
the DEP Secretary's office. 159 Based on these characteristics, the
deliberations fell within the scope of the privilege and satisfied the
"deliberations" prong of the test.' 60
The documents failed the second prong, however, because the
DEP's interest in maintaining a "free exchange of ideas" did not
outweigh Brunner's interest in accessing the requested deliberative
information.' 61 First, the case turned on the meaning of the statute
- if the Board could not determine the legislative intent from the
statute facially, the DEP's interpretation would be probative evi-
dence of the statute's meaning.1 62 Second, this information would
be highly relevant to Brunner, who had the right to challenge and
contradict the DEP's statutory interpretation. 163
155. See id. at *5 (requiring DEP to submit materials to Board for in camera
inspection).
156. EHB Docket No. 2002-304-L, 2004 WL 817746 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. Apr. 6,
2004).
157. See id. at *2 (finding responses given at depositions of DEP officials not
protected by deliberative process privilege). The DEP sought to prevent the depo-
sitions of two DEP officials from being taken. See id. at *1.
158. See id. (describing nature of intradepartmental discussions). In other
words, the discussions were not about one particular site or set of facts. See id.
159. See id. (describing intentions behind discussions).
160. See id. (applying deliberative process privilege test and finding informa-
tion could meet privilege requirements).
161. See Brunner II, 2004 WL 817746 at *3 (disagreeing with Department's
claim that discussions had no probative value).
162. See id. (finding internal discussions to be critical evidence).
163. See id. (discussing Brunner's general entitlement to exploring all perti-
nent aspects of evidence).
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IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
A. WMJ I Analysis
1. In Camera Review and the Deliberative Process Privilege in
Pennsylvania
In WM[ I, the EHB recognized its job was simply to decide
whether to grant in camera review of the e-mails involved in the
deliberative process privilege question. 164 To properly address this
issue, the EHB first discussed the state of the deliberative process
privilege in Pennsylvania. 165 The Board noted that although the
commonwealth court adopted the privilege in Tribune-Review I, the
commonwealth court relied on Vartan, which was a plurality opin-
ion, and LaValle, in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explic-
itly declined to adopt the privilege. 166 The Board nevertheless
concluded that so long as the commonwealth court recognized the
deliberative process privilege, the privilege could be asserted before
the EHB. 167
2. Deliberative Process Privilege Standard
The EHB next reviewed whether the DEP could assert the de-
liberative process privilege and whether it precluded in camera re-
view. 168 Relying heavily on Brunner land Brunner II, the EHB stated
that the privilege applies to communications that are intended to
be confidential, constitute deliberations and relate to legal or policy
matters. 169 The burden of proof is on the party asserting the privi-
lege, and the privilege is not absolute, but qualified. 170 Based on
164. See WMI I, EHB Docket No. 2004-236-K, 2005 WL 3872353, at *3 (Pa.
Env. Hrg. Bd. Feb. 14, 2005) (corrected copy issued Feb. 15, 2005) (preparing to
rule on motion by stating court's essential task).
165. See id. (referring to deliberative process privilege discussion as "detour"
from in camera review question).
166. See id. at **4-5 (noting adoption of privilege by commonwealth court
while addressing contradictory dicta issued by Pennsylvania Supreme Court). The
court also noted that in Tribune-Review I the Pennsylvania Supreme Court "did not
deny its existence or preclude its application ... [it] merely said it had not
adopted it." Id. at *5 (citing Tribune-Review Publ'g Co. v. Dep't of Cmty. and Econ.
Dev., 859 A.2d 1261, 1269 (Pa. 2004)).
167. See id. at *6 (declining to delve into "ontological" question of existence
of privilege while following Brunner holding that privilege may be asserted).
168. See id. at **6-7 (finding DEP's claim to privilege beyond proper scope).
169. See WMI I, 2005 WL 3872353 at *6 (citingJosephj Brunner, Inc. v. Dep't of
EnvIl. Prot., EHB Docket No. 2002-304-L, 2004 WL 103130, at *4 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd.
Jan. 8, 2004)) (outlining essential deliberative process privilege elements).
170. See id. at *7 (citing Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep't of the Army, 55 F.3d
827, 854 (3d Cir. 1995); BrunnerI, 2004 WL 103130 at *6; Lower Paxton Twp. v. Dep't
of EnvIl. Prot., EHB Docket No. 200-169-K, 2001 WL 300060, at *3 (Pa. Env. Hrg.
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these predicates, the EHB found the DEP's claim that the privilege
applied to general policy decisions as well as to "communications
on the subject of the particular . . . . Department action under
review at the Board" to be too broad and all-encompassing. 171
3. In Camera Review Standard
The EHB next addressed the standard for in camera review.' 72
The EHB found in camera review appropriate in many potentially
privileged situations but acknowledged it may intrude on the delib-
erative privilege if the privilege may be asserted. 173 The party chal-
lenging the privilege must show that (1) the documents are not
subject to the privilege and (2) the party's need for the information
"outweighs the government's need to keep the information se-
cret."' 74 The Board found WMI established the e-mails might not
be privileged, making in camera review for "further evaluation of
the claim of privilege" appropriate. 175 As the e-mails appeared to
relate to the specific matter of WMI's permit denial, it was "'hard to
imagine a setting . . . more antithetical to [the] application of the
deliberative process privilege."' 1 76
Most importantly, the EHB noted that it had to provide a trial
that met due process requirements. 177 If the Board did not review
the e-mails to determine whether they contained legal or policy
matters, "there would be no due process and the rights [to a due
Bd. Mar. 7, 2001)) (noting privilege can be outweighed by opposing party's inter-
est in disclosure and including crucial question of burden of proof in deliberative
process privilege overview).
171. See id. at *7 (refuting Department's broad privilege claim and noting
irony of broad claim in light of Pennsylvania Supreme Court's recent reminder
that it has never adopted privilege).
172. See WMI I, 2005 WL 3872353 at *5-6 (noting in camera review must not
be automatic).
173. See id. at **13-14 (citing City of Colorado Springs v. White, 967 P.2d 1042,
1053-54 (Colo. 1998); Killington, Ltd. v. Lash, 572 A.2d 1368, 1375-76 (Vt. 1990);
State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 629 P.2d 330, 334 (N.M.
1981); Hamilton v. Verdow, 414 A.2d 914, 926-27 (Md. 1980)) (explaining in camera
review considerations and noting that in camera review alone can violate legiti-
mate deliberative process privilege).
174. See WMI 1, 2005 WL 3872353 at *9 (citations omitted) (giving standard
for showing necessity of in camera review).
175. See id. at *10 (finding WMI presented prima facie or credible claim that
e-mails may not be entirely privileged).
176. See id. at *1 (quoting Lower Paxton Tp. v. Dep't of EnvtL Prot., EHB
Docket No. 200-169-K, 2001 WL 300060, at *3 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. Mar. 7, 2001))
(discussing role of EHB in DEP matters and importance of access to DEP deci-
sional materials given job of reviewing DEP decisions in adjudicative setting).
177. See id. at *11 (noting EHB provides due process trial of "the Depart-
ment's specific decision on its specific matter").
20071
23
Shutte: Waste Management Disposal Services of Pennsylvania v DEP: Conside
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2007
174 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAwJouuRNAL [Vol. XVIII: p. 151
process trial] granted under the Environmental Hearing Board
Act" would disappear.1 78
Even if the documents warranted deliberative process privilege
protection, WMI's need for the e-mails outweighed the DEP's inter-
est in keeping them confidential. 79 The DEP's interpretation of
the "runway flight path exclusionary regulation" was highly relevant
in determining whether WMI's permit was properly denied because
the e-mails potentially contained relevant, probative evidence cen-
tral to EHB review.180 Assuming the EHB would apply NARCO def-
erence to the DEP's interpretation of the runway flight exclusion,
every available piece of evidence would be crucial to WMI's presen-
tation of its case. 18 1
B. WVI II Analysis
After in camera review of the three e-mails, the EHB in WM II
determined the documents were not privileged because they did
not pertain to "legal or policy matters. '"182 Even if the documents
were covered by the privilege, the Board found WMI was entitled to
disclosure of the documents under the balancing test.'8 3 The
Board proceeded to discuss the deliberative process privilege stan-
dard of review outlined in WM/1 8 4 The EHB noted its WM II
decision should be read together with its WMI I decision.I8 5 Citing
178. See id. (addressing potential mistake of denying due process in favor of
deliberative process privilege). If the e-mails contained any legal or policy matters,
a partial redaction might instead be appropriate. See id.
179. See WMI I, 2005 WL 3872353 at *15 (discussing application of "interest"
prong of in camera review standard).
180. See id. (citingJosephj Brunner, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., EHB Docket No.
2002-304-L, 2004 WL 817746, at **5-7 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. Apr. 6, 2004)) (explain-
ing relevance of DEP's interpretation of regulation to WMI I and comparing in
camera review standard applied in Brunner II to WM/ I application).
181. See id. at *14 (describing escalating need for probative evidence about
DEP decision-making as more agency deference is applied during EHB review).
The opinion did not disavow the DEP's claim that allowing disclosure would pre-
vent free and open discussion in its decision-making. See id.
182. See Waste Mgmt. Disposal Servs. of Pa., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., EHB
Docket No. 2004-236-K, 2005 WL 3872354, at *1 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. Feb. 22, 2005)
(declining to find privilege in DEP documents).
183. See id. at **12-13 (applying balancing test).
184. See id. at **2-3 (referring to deliberative process privilege elements as
"predicates" and reviewing balancing portion of deliberative process privilege
test). A court must first determine whether the "predicates for the privilege are
present," then apply the balancing test. See id. at *2.
185. See id. at *1 (explaining complimentary relationship of VM! I and WA/
I). After WM/ I, the Board offered the parties the opportunity to request any
other proceedings they might want. See id. at **1-2. WMI did not submit a further
brief and did not request an evidentiary hearing. See id. The DEP submitted a
supplemental brief but did not request any other proceedings. See id.
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Joe, the Board also emphasized the need to construe the privilege
narrowly. ' 86
The Board described the contents of the e-mails as a "detailed
recitation of the legal position of the Department" regarding the
interpretation of the runway flight exclusion.18 7 The e-mails pro-
vided a "foundation" for the Department's interpretation of the
regulation and the reasons it would not accept WMI's interpreta-
tion.188 The e-mails "[were] not diological but monological." 189
They were not a "give and take" between two persons in the course
of developing an interpretation of the runway exclusionary flight
regulation. 90 The e-mails simply applied the regulation to WMI's
situation. 191 The e-mails therefore did not develop an interpreta-
tion but instead made a reasoned statement.' 92
The Board next analyzed each "predicate" necessary to find
the deliberative process privilege - the items must be confidential,
deliberative and concern legal or policy matters. 93 First, the Board
determined that the Department 'just barely" met the "confidenti-
ality" predicate. 194 Although marking a document "confidential"
does not automatically make it so, the DEP offered evidence that
suggested the series of three e-mails was not intended for broad
publication. 195
Second, the Board found the e-mails met the "deliberative or
deliberations" predicate of the privilege.19 6 The e-mails showed
careful consideration, showed the author was trying to avoid error,
reflected careful thought and reflected consultations with others. 197
The Board stressed, however, that the e-mails did not "deliberate"
186. See id. at *3 (citing Joe v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 782 A.2d 24, 33 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2001)) (emphasizing Pennsylvania's narrow take on evidentiary
privileges).
187. See WMIII, 2005 WL 3872354 at *3 (describing contents of DEP e-mails).
188. See id. (describing foundational quality of e-mails).
189. See id. (describing monologue quality of e-mails).
190. See id. at *3 (calling e-mails recitation of regulation's application rather
than interpretive exchange of ideas).
191. See id. at *5 (describing singular application of e-mails).
192. See WMII, 2005 WL 3872354 at *5 (describing statement-like qualities of
DEP e-mails).
193. See id. at **2-12 (containing "predicates" analyses).
194. See id. at **3-4 (applying confidentiality predicate).
195. See id. at *4 (finding minimal requirements for confidentiality predi-
cate).
196. See id. at *5 (applying deliberative or deliberations predicate).
197. See WWI II, 2005 WL 3872354 at *5 (describing evidence of careful
thought in e-mails).
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or "interpret" the airport runway exclusion. 98 Rather, the e-mails
deliberated the regulation's application to the WMI landfill. 199
Third, the Board found the e-mails did not meet the "legal and
policy matters" predicate of the privilege. 200 This predicate does
not provide "blanket coverage" to communications concerning a
particularized Department decision but instead protects "broad,
general policy and legal discussions."20 1 The Board found the e-
mails "so site specific" that they could not fairly fit the privilege. 20 2
Quoting extensively from WM! I and contrasting the e-mails with
the communications in Brunner II, the EHB found the substance of
the e-mails to be "one hundred percent within this very case." 203
The e-mails did not discuss any rule or statute generally and did not
contain a "dialogical discussion" about the meaning of a new stat-
ute, as was the case in Brunner.20 4
The Board also rejected the Department's use of Public Utilities
Commission.20 5 While the case upheld the protection of certain in-
ternal deliberations of the PUC in a challenge to new regulations,
the PUC functions as both regulator and quasi-judicial trier of
fact.20 6 In contrast, the EHB is the independent quasi-judicial
branch of Pennsylvania's environmental governing bodies.207 It is
not part of a combined executive/judicial administrative entity.208
198. See id. (calling e-mails works of apology rather than development of
interpretation).
199. See id. at *5 (emphasizing lack of interpretive development in e-mails).
200. See id. at **5-13 (containing legal and policy matters analysis).
201. See id. at **6-7 (finding e-mails did not meet legal and policy matters
predicate).
202. See WMI II, 2005 WL 3872354 at *6 (finding specificity of e-mails to site
factored into lack of legal or policy matters in e-mails).
203. See id. at **6-7 (reiterating WMJ I opinion).
204. See id. (contrasting Waste Management litigation to Brunner). The Board's
discussion in WMI I, that under the EHB Act a department decision is not techni-
cally final until the aggrieved party has an opportunity for a de novo due process
trial before the Board, was not meant to put the e-mails into the pre-decisional
category. See id. at *10. The Board made this notation in WM lIas a reason "the
privilcge should not be read in the context of litigation under the [EHB Act] to
apply to communications . . . which are specifically and exclusively on the very
matter which is subject to review pursuant to the [EHB Act]." Id.
205. See id. at **10-11 (citing Pennsylvania v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 331 A.2d 598
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975)) (rejecting DEP reliance on case involving different ad-
ministrative setup compared to DEP and EHB).
206. See WMIII, 2005 WL 3872354 at **10-11 (noting PUC system is not like
three-part environmental regulation system set up by EHB Act).
207. See id. at *11 (quoting 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7513(a)) (explaining EHB's
independent judicial role).
208. See id. at **10-11 (distinguishing role of PUC). The Board also declined
to agree with the DEP's use of Rupert v. United States, 225 F.R.D. 154 (M.D. Pa.
2004), where the privilege applied because the government document made a rec-
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When the DEP makes an executive decision, the EHB is "open to
review [a DEP] decision with all [of] the due process guaran-
tees."20 9 In sum, the clear statutory separation between the EHB
and DEP particularly mandates that the EHB provide complete de
novo review because it is not reviewing decisions made within a
combined administrative department.2 10 The Board found the
DEP's citation of this case to be irrelevant to the deliberative pro-
cess privilege issue.2 11
The Board then applied the balancing test.2 12 The Board
found WMI's interest in the e-mails greatly outweighed the DEP's
interest in keeping the e-mails confidential. 213 The e-mails were rel-
evant because they discussed the application of a regulation with
respect to a particular landfill.2 14 The communications rated not
only "one-hundred percent on the relevancy scale," they also rated
"one hundred percent on the importance scale." 215 As explained
in WMI I, for the Board to give NARCO deference to the Depart-
ment's interpretation of the regulation, the Board itself needed ac-
cess to all relevant probative evidence, including the e-mails.2 1 6
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Board properly applied the deliberative process privilege
analysis to determine whether to conduct in camera review in WMI
ommendation on a matter which was not yet final; thus the communication was
pre-decisional. The Board agreed that a communication must be pre-decisional to
fall within the privilege, but the parties took as a given that the e-mails were pre-
decisional and so that demarcation was not an issue in the case. See id. at **8-9
(citing Rupert v. United States, 225 F.R.D. 154 (M.D. Pa. 2004)).
209. See id. at *11 (distinguishing relationship between DEP and EHB com-
pared to commingled administrative and judicial roles of other departments).
210. See id. (citing Pennsylvania Trout v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 863 A.2d 93,
106 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004)) (emphasizing de novo nature of EHB review).
211. See WMI II, 2005 WL 3872354 at *10 (finding Public Utilities Commission
inapposite to WM/ 11 issue).
212. See id. at *12 (applying balancing test).
213. See id. at *13 (finding need for e-mails outweighed any claim of
privilege).
214. See id. (explaining relevancy of e-mails).
215. See id. (describing relevant contents of e-mails).
216. See WMI II, 2005 WL 3872354 at **14-15 (citing Josephj Brunner, Inc. v.
Dep't of Envtl. Prot., EHB Docket No. 2002-304-L, slip. op. at 5, 2004 WL 817746, at
**3-4 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. Apr. 6, 2004); WMI, EHB Docket No. 2004-236-K, 2005
WL 3872353, at **13-14 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. Feb. 14, 2005)) (corrected copy issued
Feb. 15, 2005) (explaining how NARCO deference fits into need to present full
evidentiary record). The WWIVBoard explained: "In other words, the more work
the Department wants NARCO to do in terms of providing weight or deference to
its interpretation of the regulation, the more probative evidence about the Depart-
ment's interpretation of the regulation becomes." WMI 1, 2005 WL 3872353 at
*14.
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land properly allowed discovery of the e-mails in WMIIL21 7 When
the deliberative process balancing test is correctly applied, it is pos-
sible to find that a non-government party does need privileged
materials. 218 When courts discount the essentiality of the balancing
step, however, its mechanized yet flexible qualities disappear and
the likelihood that a court will find a party needs privileged materi-
als decreases. 219
In the collective Waste Management decisions, the Board did not
ignore the importance of preventing an intra-agency "chilling ef-
fect," and it did not fail to acknowledge Kaiser Aluminum and other
cases that established the essentiality of the privilege to a function-
ing government department. 220 The Board, however, rightly tem-
pered the strength of the deliberative process privilege in order to
protect a party's right to access probative evidence. 221 In doing so,
the Board differentiated between preventing a "chilling effect" and
permitting a form of privilege that disallows any access to adminis-
trative decision-making by the permittee or the reviewing court.22 2
When an individual permittee must try to present its case in
the face of NARCO deference, "the evidence becomes... extremely
highly relevant and . . .extremely highly important. 2 23 In Waste
217. See WMI I, 2005 WL 3872353 at **6-15 (setting forth deliberative stan-
dard and applying it to facts of case); WMIII, 2005 WL 3872354 at *18 (compelling
production of three e-mails).
218. See Wetlaufer, supra note 5, at 892 (noting effects of deliberative process
privilege on private litigants). The author notes:
One might object and say that, because this is a qualified privilege and
the courts take [effects on private litigants] into account, it does not oper-
ate in a way that affects the outcome of litigation. But this assumes that
the only discovery that matters is that discovery which the party seeking it
could, prior to discovery, demonstrate to be particularly important.
Id.
219. See id. (noting diminished rights of individual litigants under assertion of
privilege). Wetlaufer notes the effects on individual litigants include: "a dimin-
ished likelihood that the individual will win a case that, absent the privilege, would
have been decided in her favor... and, in the event she loses, a diminished sense
that she has been treated fairly by the system." Id.
220. See WMII, 2005 WL 3872353 at *9 (citing Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp.
v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 947 (Ct. Cl. 1958)) (reviewing important ele-
ments of privilege).
221. See, e.g., Wetlaufer, supra note 5, at 892-93 (noting that deliberative pro-
cess privilege may deprive citizens of needed information).
222. See WMII, 2005 WL 3872354 at **14-15 (quotingJosephj Brunner, Inc. v.
Dep't ofEnvtl. Prot., EHB Docket No. 2002-304-L, slip op. at 5-7, 2004 WL 817746, at
**3-4 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. Apr. 6, 2004)) (explaining that DEP interpretation of
statute may be needed by EHB to determine correctness of that interpretation).
223. See id. at *15 (explaining how NARCO deference heightens importance
of every available piece of evidence). The Board stated: "For the Department to
use NARCO and then be able to hide evidence of DEP's interpretation of the regu-
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Management and in all cases before the EHB, neither the permittee
nor the EHB should have to limit their evidentiary review to the
DEP's statement of its interpretation of a statute or code section. 224
Rather, the EHB should be allowed access to deliberative materials
so it understands to what information it is deferring, and the per-
mittee should have access in order to effectively present its position
to the Board. 225
The Board's application of the deliberative process privilege
test withstands the DEP's argument that the EHB misapplied the
test.226 In its Commonwealth Court Brief on Petition for Review of
the Order of the EHB, the DEP argued the Board incorrectly found
the "legal and policy matters" portion of the test included only de-
liberations about generally-applied policies but not to deliberations
about an individualized permit application. 227 The DEP felt there
was no precedent and no justification for excluding individualized
deliberative decisions from deliberative protection. 228
The WMI I decision is weak because of the lack of case law
supporting the position that "legal or policy matters" do not in-
clude documents relating to individually adjudicated agency deci-
lation creates a very unfair set of circumstances. In short, WMI, the Board and the
people of this Commonwealth are being told, 'heads I win, tails you lose."' Id.
224. See id. at *14 (quotingJoseph J Brunner, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., EHB
Docket No. 2002-304-L, slip. op. at 5 n.2, 2004 WL 817746, at *3 n.2 (Pa. Env. Hrg.
Bd. Apr. 6, 2004)) (emphasizing that because Department interpretation is itself
evidence, petitioner has interest in its disclosure). As stated in Brunner I, "it would
seem that the more weight the Department's position is entitled to, the greater its
probative value." Brunner II, 2004 WL 817746 at *3 n.2.
225. See id. at *15 (noting NARCO did not answer what constitutes DEP "inter-
pretation" of regulations that are central to disputes between DEP and litigants).
226. See Brief of Petitioner at 18, Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Waste Mgmt. Disposal
Servs. of Pa., No. 0422 CD 2005 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 13, 2005) (arguing against
EHB "claim" that it can probe "mental processes" of administrators in individual
decisions as opposed to general regulatory matters). But see Brief of Respondent at
15-19, Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Waste Mgmt. Disposal Servs. of Pa., No. 0422 CD
2005 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 19, 2005) (finding EHB did not use "legal or policy
matters" to sweepingly exclude every document relating to an individual
petitioner).
227. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 226, at 11 (finding no basis for EHB
distinction between individual and broadly-impacting Department decisions in de-
ciding whether to apply deliberative process privilege). But see Brief of Respon-
dent, supra note 226, at 18 (arguing that under DEP's interpretation of legal or
policy matters little or nothing is left for review on permit appeal).
228. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 226, at 18 (arguing that under EHB
analysis all deliberations would be exposed to scrutiny by any person or judge since
"vast majority" of DEP decisions involve individual case decisions rather than state
wide regulatory decisions). But see Brief of Respondent, supra note 226, at 18 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. May 19, 2005) (arguing that under DEP interpretation of legal or
policy matters few documents would be protected by deliberative process
privilege).
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sions. 229 The EHB primarily refers to other EHB decisions,
including Brunner land Brunner II, for its position on this matter.23 0
The appellate courts, however, lack sufficient common law in this
area, making the Waste Management reliance on EHB decisions prac-
tical if not completely strong.2 31
As the Board noted, it appeared the e-mails did nothing to de-
velop the DEP's interpretation of the runway exclusion; if they had,
the e-mail discussions would have been about "legal or policy mat-
ters."2 32 While no case law specifically states that "legal or policy
matters" do not include individualized adjudicative decisions, case
law certainly does discuss the need to protect an individual's due
process rights. 233 The Board, therefore, gave proper weight to due
process access to the DEP e-mails where no existing precedent in-
cludes individualized application of law as part of protected "legal
and policy matters."23 4
Examining the issue in terms of due process, the Board cor-
rectly recognized that the privilege should be reserved for genera-
lized administrative decisions.2 35 An overbroad interpretation of
"legal or policy matters" could prevent a person's access to govern-
ment documents specifically about him or her.2 36 As the Board
stated, the scope of the privilege claimed by the Department was
"breathtaking."237 "It is one thing," warned the Board, "to say that
229. See generally WMIII, EHB Docket No. 2004-236-K, 2005 WL 3872354 (Pa.
Env. Hrg. Bd. Feb. 22, 2005) (citing EHB cases for support of position on legal or
policy matters predicate).
230. See WMI I, EHB Docket No. 2004-236-K, 2005 WL 3872353, at **10-11
(Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. Feb. 14, 2005) (corrected copy issued Feb. 15, 2005) (noting
that privilege, if it exists, must be construed in light of EHB Act, including focused
rather than "maximalistic" view of "legal or policy matters" predicate).
231. See id. at *11 (noting that DEP's expansive interpretation of "legal and
policy matters" would eliminate due process rights under EHB Act).
232. See id. (noting possibility that opinions of general application could be
interspersed with individualized opinions).
233. See Brief of Respondent, supra note 225, at 23 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 19,
2005) (arguing real "public interest" is not secrecy but transparency in municipal
waste permitting).
234. For a discussion of the legal and policy matters predicate, see supra notes
199-204 and accompanying text.
235. See WMI I, 2005 WL 3872353 at **10-14 (showing importance of final
balancing step by emphasizing importance of e-mail to WMI because "runway
flight path exclusionary criteria" is central to case).
236. See id. at *11 (emphasizing importance of due process rights in EHB set-
ting under EHB Act).
237. See id. at *7 (finding DEP's claim to deliberative process privilege "all
encompassing"); but see Brief of Petitioner, supra note 226, at 18 (stating that there
is no reason to support EHB's claim that it may "probe into the mental processes"
of administrators in individualized context as opposed to "Commonwealth-wide
regulatory impact decisions").
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there ought to be a deliberative process privilege, but it is another
to say that it ought to be all-encompassing . 238
In its brief to the commonwealth court, the DEP also argued
that the EHB overstepped its authority to review DEP decisions.239
Although the DEP maintained the EHB did not have the "sweep-
ing" right to overrule, in WMI H the Board simply maintained that
its job is to conduct fair trials and protect individual ights, never
asserting an unrestrained overruling power. 240 The difference in
viewpoint between the DEP and EHB is akin to focusing on the
constitutional separation of powers concept rather than the due
process privilege. 241
The EHB uses a de novo standard to review DEP decisions
about an individual's right to proceed with a permit, duty to pay
fees or another individualized administrative decision. 242 Although
different from a criminal proceeding in substance, the EHB trial
process is similar in that it is an adjudication of individual rights. 2 43
While the EHB process is also unlike the special presidential/crimi-
nal circumstances of Nixon, the final step of the deliberative process
privilege test, where an individual's need for evidentiary materials
can outweigh the government's claim of confidentiality, reminds a
238. See WM II, 2005 WL 3872353 at *7 (disagreeing strongly with proposition
that all deliberations on part of DEP are protected in wide scope). Contra Brief of
Respondent, supra note 226, at 27 (arguing WMI and EHB could still address ulti-
mate question of DEP's interpretation of regulation without e-mails).
239. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 226, at 18-19 (disagreeing with EHB's
argument that under EHB Act no adverse DEP action is final until de novo EHB
hearing).
240. See id. at 19 (finding EHB "assertion" that case-specific emails are not
"legal and policy matters" to be based on erroneous notion that EHB has role of
decision-maker).
241. See City of Colorado Springs v. White, 967 P.2d 1042, 1047-48 (Colo. 1998)
(distinguishing justifications for deliberative privilege). The position of the DEP
seems to fit within the constitutional argument for privilege rather than the "fish
bowl" justification. See id.
242. See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7514 (establishing jurisdiction of Board). Board
jurisdiction includes: "[t]he power and duty to hold hearings and issue adjudica-
tions under 2 Pa.C.S. Ch. 5 Subch. A (relating to practice and procedure of Com-
monwealth agencies) on orders, permits, licenses or decisions of the department."
Id. § 7514(a).
243. See id. § 7514(c) (continuing jurisdiction standards). The section reads:
The department may take an action initially without regard to 2 Pa.C.S.
Ch. 5 Subch. A, but no action of the department adversely affecting a
person shall be final as to that person until the person has had the oppor-
tunity to appeal the action to the board under subsection (g). If a person
has not perfected an appeal in accordance with the regulations of the
board, the department's action shall be final as to the person.
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court to adhere to its responsibility to conduct a trial on full, fair
evidence.2 44
The basic differences between the type of policymaking con-
ducted by the Secretary of Agriculture in Morgan and the decision
whether to issue a landfill permit in Waste Management should also
be noted, especially in light of the DEP's argument that the EHB
has no right to "probe into the mental processes of administrators
in the context of an individual case decision." 245 Morgan involved
communications to the Secretary of Agriculture, while Waste Man-
agement involved communications between localized decision-mak-
ing authorities. 246 The Secretary's decision in Morgan impacted an
entire industry at once, while Waste Management involved a particu-
lar permit rejection pertaining to a singular DEP applicant.247 An
244. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974) (noting separation of
powers was not meant to "operate with absolute independence").
245. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 226, at 17-18 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 13,
2005) (citing Commonwealth v. Vartan, 733 A.2d 1258, 1265 (Pa. 1999)) (finding
EHB position on legal or policy matters based upon "bald assertions"). In the
portion of Vartan cited by the DEP in its brief, the commonwealth court's refer-
ence to "mental processes" reflects its notation that many intermediate courts in
Pennsylvania have followed United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941) "by hold-
ing that the deliberations of public officials are not subject to discovery." Vartan,
733 A.2d at 1265 (citing cases following Morgan). It is important to note that
Vartan protected the deliberations of ChiefJustice Nix based on what it called the
"deliberative process privilege." Id. at 1263. Protecting a former member of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has the "agency head" aspect of Morgan which first
protected the mental processes of the Secretary of Agriculture. Id. (citing United
States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941)). While Vartan cites Pennsylvania cases
following Morgan, these decisions reflect the imprecise use of Morgan: the "chilling
effect" is the traditional lower-level justification for administrative privilege. While
Morgan provides essential privilege principles, its indiscriminate use by many
courts blurs decision-makers' "mental processes" with "deliberative process" docu-
ments and allows the DEP to use the case to argue in Waste Management for the
privilege to apply to e-mails created by the Southeast Regional Office Waste Man-
ager and directed to (1) the Deputy Secretary for Field Operations or (2) the
Department representative on the Pottstown Landfill Closure Committee, carbon
copied to the Deputy Secretary. See Waste Mgmt. Disposal Servs. of Pa., Inc. v. Dep't qf
Envtl. Prot., EHB Docket No. 2004-236-K, 2005 WL 3872353, at **2-3 (Pa. Env. Hrg.
Bd. Feb. 14, 2005) (corrected copy issued Feb. 15, 2005).
246. See Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 475-76 (1936) (describing Secre-
tary's delegation of reasonable livestock rates to Acting Secretaries); but see WMI I,
EHB Docket No. 2004-236-K, 2005 WL 3872354, at **6-9 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. Feb.
22, 2005) (describing writers, recipients and contents of e-mails). See also Brief of
Petitioner, supra note 226, at 10 (referring to e-mail communications as "high-
level").
247. See Morgan, 298 U.S. 468, 471 (1936) (explaining that case consolidated
fifty different suits on price-fixing issue); but see WMIII, 2005 WL 3872354 at **3-4
(noting e-mails deliberated on specific question of whether airport runway exclu-
sionary criteria applied in this particular case). As the EHB stated, "[t]hese e-mails
are works of apology (apology in its classic meaning, i.e., defense of, or reasoned
statement in argument of, not meaning contrition for) of an interpretation, not
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industry-wide, nationwide or generalized policy decision is quite dif-
ferent from the situation of an individual or entity that receives a
citation in the mail, or the petitioner who needs to know how the
DEP decided its case so that it can make a positional argument on
appeal to the Board.248 These differences suggest the need for a
more narrowly tailored deliberative process privilege in the EHB
setting, given the personally targeted procedure inherent to DEP
permitting and violation citation.249
VI. CONCLUSION
Pennsylvania is overdue for a denouement to its ongoing delib-
erative process privilege play. Because Waste Management went to
trial without a resolution by the commonwealth court on the as-
serted deliberative process privilege, the judiciary unfortunately lost
an opportunity to state the privilege's application in the context of
an EHB trial in contrast to administrative hearings in different state
administrative departments. 250 Available case law and the defini-
tions section of the RTKA show that the deliberative process privi-
lege in Pennsylvania appears widely accepted although not officially
adopted. 251 Looking only at the facts of the cases dealing with the
issue, it can be said that the privilege applies to formerjudges, as in
Vartan, and to many items requested through the RTKA, as exem-
plified in LaValle and Tribune-Review. 252 Whether the privilege ap-
plies with equal force in the context of the EHB, however, remains
unsettled. 253
the development of an interpretation," thus applying solely to this applicant. Id. at
*4.
248. See WMJ 1, 2005 WL 3872353 at *10 (describing DEP decision-making
information as part of Appellant's right).
249. Contra Brief of Petitioner, supra note 226, at 23-28 (arguing disclosure of
"internal deliberations" not necessary for due process).
250. See Waste Mgmt. Disposal Servs. of Pa., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., EHB
Docket No. 2004-236-K, 2005 WL 3872378, at *2 n.1 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. May 18,
2005) (explaining circumstances of dropped deliberative process privilege issue
within adjudication dismissing WMI's appeal).
251. See, e.g., WMI , 2005 WL 3872353 at *5 (relying on commonwealth
court's adoption of deliberative process privilege).
252. See Commonwealth v. Vartan, 733 A.2d 1258, 1263 (Pa. 1999) (finding sup-
port in deliberative process privilege theory); LaValle v. Office of Gen. Counsel for the
Commonwealth, 769 A.2d 449, 454-55 (Pa. 2001) (interpreting RTKA exception);
Tribune-Review Publ'g Co. v. Dep't of Cmty. and Econ. Dev., 859 A.2d 1261, 1269 (Pa.
2004) (declining to adopt deliberative privilege); Tribune-Review Publ'g Co. v. Dep't
of Cmty. and Econ. Dev., 814 A.2d 1261, 1263-64 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (adopting
deliberative process privilege).
253. See WMI I, 2005 WL 3872353, at *6 (Pa. Env. Hrg. Bd. Feb. 14, 2005)
(corrected copy issued Feb. 15, 2005) (assuming deliberative process privilege ex-
ists without solving question).
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Waste Management is controversial for its assertion of individual
rights in the face of some precedent favoring the government's
right to confidentiality of certain deliberative documents. 254 The
EHB and DEP will continue to disagree over the application of the
deliberative process privilege because of its role in establishing the
extent to which the EHB can review the DEP and its role in framing
the scope of due process afforded an environmental petitioner. 255
On appeal to the commonwealth court on this issue, the DEP ar-
gued that none of its documents would remain privileged under
WMIII.256 As long as the Department has made an official interpre-
tation of the relevant regulation or statute, however, mere debates
between lower-level or intermediate-level officials should be
discoverable.2 5
7
When the opportunity arises, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
should distinguish between deliberative processes conducted at very
high levels of an agency from processes conducted at lower
levels. 258 The court should also be skeptical of the use of the "chil-
ling effect" justification for the privilege when information sought
to be protected directly impacts a stand-alone litigant.259 Most im-
portantly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court should consider the ad-
ministrative setup of the EHB and DEP as compared to
administrative agencies that both execute regulations and function
as quasi-judicial bodies.260
Megan E. Shutte
254. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct.
Cl. 1958) (establishing modern deliberative process privilege theory of govern-
ment protection).
255. See Brief of Respondent, supra note 226, at 18 (arguing that DEP's view of
deliberative process privilege "legal and policy matters" predicate leaves little or
nothing for EHB to review in permit appeal).
256. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 226, at 25-26 (setting forth "deference"
argument emphasizing fights of Department).
257. WMI II, 2005 WL 3872354 at **6-12 (discussing "legal and policy mat-
ters" predicate).
258. See Tribune-Review Publ'g Co. v. Dep't of Cmty. and Econ. Dev., 859 A.2d 1261
(Pa. 2004) (declining to adopt deliberative process privilege in 2004).
259. Contra LaValle v. Office of Gen. Counsel of the Commonwealth, 769 A.2d 449,
461 (Pa. 2001) (Cappy, J. concurring) (stating belief of need to adopt deliberative
process privilege because of "chilling effect" without it).
260. See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7511 (describing unique setup of Pennsylvania
environmental administration).
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